Giorgio perlasca admirable traits in a person

Giorgio Perlasca is a hero because he is extremely brave and risked his own life under perilous conditions to save others. Perlasca was a Italian fascist who fought in the Spanish Civil War. From there he took matters into his own hands and used his Spanish power to save Jewish lives. Perlasca posed as a fake Spanish diplomat while issuing protective passes for Jews and providing safe houses for them.

If he was caught by the Germans doing this, the consequences would have been so severe that he would have been killed for his acts. His actions, under such extremely difficult and perilous situations, show just how selfless and brave he was. He left a note for Perlasca imploring him to leave too. Realizing that without protection many Jews would be killed, Perlasca bravely decided to remain.

Despite being informed that the homes of Spanish diplomats were being raided, that people were being taken and transported to concentration camps, and that diplomats were also being killed, he choose to stay! By deciding to stay, he placed his own life, by the hands of the Nazis, in perilous danger. However, despite the risk to his own life, he decided to stick up for what he believed was right: to protect the people he had already saved, rather than saving his own and leave them stranded and helpless.

His action, in this particular example, further highlight just how brave he was. His actions relates back to the main idea of this essay because he chose, at this particular moment, to stay despite the danger he placed himself in. His actions portray all the traits of braveness. Perlasca, despite the information he received, could have run away and saved himself, but instead he decided to risk it all for the people he was protecting.

Giorgio Perlasca is not only brave by risking his life to save others, but his very actions show a selflessness nature. On many occasions, Giorgio put the lives of others before his own, and cared more about sparing innocent lives of strangers rather than protecting and saving his own. There are many qualities that people find admirable. Some common ones include honesty, integrity, kindness, empathy, courage, humility, and resilience.

For example, you might find it admirable when someone consistently tells the truth even in difficult situations, demonstrating honesty and integrity. Likewise, you could be impressed by someone who always treats others with kindness and empathy, making them feel valued and understood. In a relationship, you can identify good qualities in a person by observing their actions, communication, and how they treat you and others.

For instance, if your partner listens to your feelings and validates them, they likely possess strong empathy. Another example is if your partner is willing to make compromises and work through disagreements in a respectful manner, which demonstrates their commitment and understanding. A quality becomes admirable in a person when it positively impacts others and creates a nurturing environment.

For example, generosity is admirable because it involves selflessly giving to others and spreading kindness, which can make the world a better place. Aside from common qualities, some unique qualities that can be admired include adaptability, creativity, grace under pressure, and openness to learning. Another example is someone who thrives in high-pressure situations, maintaining a sense of calm and control, which can be inspiring to others.

To embody a quality you admire in others, you can start by being intentional about practicing and cultivating that trait. This might involve setting personal goals, reflecting on your actions and attitudes, and learning from role models who possess the quality. For example, if you admire patience in others and want to become more patient yourself, you could try setting small goals for staying calm in frustrating situations and learning from those who handle stress well.

By cultivating these admirable traits within yourself, you not only demonstrate a strong moral compass but also leave a lasting impact on those around you: 1. Being a Good Ally Good allies are people who are friendly, considerate, and collaborative. Showing Understanding Showing understanding means being open, accepting, and attentive to the feelings and needs of others.

Displaying Loyalty Being loyal means standing by your friends and loved ones, even when things get tough.

Giorgio perlasca admirable traits in a person

Branden Harvey. Good Resources. Positive Words. Good Recommendations. Support Good News. Article Details Published On. Introduction The human enterprises of self-improvement and education through virtue cultivation have large been underestimated among moral philosophers the last few decades Russell, The role of moral exemplars has been similarly neglected, despite the fact that pointing to models of different virtues seems to be a very effective way to remind ourselves of the kind of persons we wish to be.

This paper inquires into the role exemplars play in moral education by drawing insights from two different but intertwined debates: namely, the debate on the necessary conditions for moral exemplarity and the debate regarding the unity-disunity of the virtues. Two prominent models of exemplarity arise out of the former, i. On the other hand, the latter focuses on the im possibility of admitting that possessing one virtue requires having them all.

Therefore, as will become clear in Section 2, the latter debate challenges the authenticity of heroes as moral exemplars, for they display only one virtue to an exceptional degree. Our aim is to show that such a pluralistic account is preferable to a more selective perspective, that is one that restricts the notion of moral exemplarity to either exemplarity in all respects or single-virtue exemplarity.

In Section 1 we lay the ground for our argument by recalling the core claims of exemplarism and explaining why this perspective is apt for character education. In Section 4, we analyze the effectiveness of moral heroes and moral saints for character education according to the criteria provided by PEBAME. In particular, we focus our attention on the educatornovice relationship to cast light on the strategies that the educator should adopt when presenting novices with exemplars.

Finally, in the conclusion we face the typical unitarist objection and show how the account we provided accommodates it. Why exemplarism? Exemplarism, as Zagzebski conceives it , , , , , is a non-standard foundationalist view, in that the foundation of the theory is not conceptual: roughly, the idea is that we pick moral exemplars by direct reference to exceptional individuals identified through the 1 emotion of admiration Zagzebski, The benefits of adopting an exemplar-based approach to character education are the 2 following.

First, exemplarism restores exemplars as the key to individuating, classifying, and cultivating the virtues, whereas other moral theories ignore or downplay the role of exemplars. On the one hand, standard forms of virtue ethics have not paid that much attention to the role of exemplars. On the other, Kantian deontologists do not commit themselves to talking about exemplars, as they are not willing to concede that reasons for acting can be drawn from outside the rational agent, without falling into a heteronomous account of morality.

These considerations help to explain the second relevant feature of exemplarism, that is the fact that it aims at practical and educational implications. What is most interesting about exemplars, as exemplarism conceives them, is their capacity for motivating us to become good: encountering a moral exemplar, in person or through narratives, elicits our admiration and can be of the utmost moral significance, capable of changing the course of our lives in significant ways.

As Iris Murdoch would have said, morality is not primarily a matter of struggling in order to act well, but has to do above all with having a strong 3 attachment towards the right people and being inspired by them. Thirdly, exemplarism provides a convincing phenomenology of admiration. Indeed, it grants both that we can be mistaken about the exemplars we naturally admire, and that 4 we are in the position to revise our judgments upon reflection.

Therefore, the educational strategy suggested by exemplarism perfectly suits the actual practice of moral development, which is constituted by continuous attempts to emulate exemplars. Finally, 5 exemplarism clarifies the role of emulation in character education. We consider this particular feature of the exemplarist theory noteworthy, for the idea of emulating models is especially important for those who work in education.

Thus, the capacity to assess whether or not we are emulating authentic exemplars does not depend on emulation itself; rather, it rests on our ability to identify them through admiration and to judge upon reflection that they are adequate objects of this emotion. Following Blum, we may gather the wide variety of moral 6 exemplars into two main types, namely moral heroes and moral saints.

Heroes represent the model of single-virtue exemplarity, heroes display at least one virtue to an exceptional degree. Most interpreters consider single-virtue exemplars to be most appropriate to the sphere of courage i. No attention is apparently paid to the possibility of there being generous, humble — and so on — models of the single-virtue exemplarity.

On the contrary, we take these cases as possible: thus, we admit that someone can be a moral exemplar not only for her outstanding courage, but also for her exceptional generosity, honesty, compassion or humility. On the other hand, saints represent the model of exemplarity without qualification, as they are supposed to possess all the virtues.

Most interpreters acknowledge the exemplarity of both models — see, in particular, Blum and Urmson — while Adams , McGinn , and Wolf focus almost exclusively on moral saints, though this does not exclude in principle the exemplarity of other models, such as heroes. Finally, Zagzebski forthcoming endorses a threefold account of exemplars. In particular, she distinguishes among the hero, the saint and the sage, where the last category includes those who display wisdom at the utmost degree.

Here we come to the point where the debate concerning the unity of the virtues crosses that of moral exemplarity. If a moral exemplar does not possess all the virtues, she cannot have any of them, as strong unitarists hold see Blum, 51 , yet she might still consistently be a moral hero, according to disunitarists. Simply speaking, unitarists follow Aristotle in claiming that in order to have a real virtue one needs to possess all of them, whereas disunitarists argue that one can possess a genuine virtue without displaying others.

Among unitarists, we can number Irwin , Annas , Wolf , and Russell There appear to be compelling reasons in support of both positions. Unitarists typically hold that any single virtue needs to be accompanied by practical wisdom — the intellectual virtue responsible for shaping character in all its expressions — in order to be an acquired trait instead of merely a natural one.

Disunitarists, on the other hand, often appeal to experience that shows that one can clearly be, for example, honest but fearful, or tactful but intemperate, and so on. More radically, disunitarists often claim that there are, at least occasionally, incompatibilities among virtues: it can be impossible, at times, to behave both frankly and tactfully, for example when telling the truth to someone will hurt them.

Rather, we maintain that the disunitarist view allows us to defend a pluralistic account of character education, for it includes a greater number of exemplars than the unitarist one; this is because the former, unlike the latter, concedes that both moral heroes and moral saints are authentically virtuous. Therefore, we endorse a prima facie disunitarist perspective, as we do not commit ourselves to provide arguments in support of disunitarism as a moral theory, yet we accept its fundamental thesis about the legitimacy of both forms of moral exemplarity to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses for an exemplarist account of character education.

We have so far outlined the advantages offered by an exemplarist perspective on character education, identified two main kinds of moral exemplars, and assumed that the exemplarity of both is not under question. Our next move is to combine an exemplar-based approach to moral education with the tradition of Aristotelian character education in which exemplarism itself is rooted, in order to develop a pluralistic exemplar-based account of moral education account PEBAME.

What does it mean to become morally good, that is, virtuous, in a standard virtue-ethicist perspective? Following the Aristotelian tradition Sherman, ; Steutel and Carr, we take it not as being primarily concerned with grasping the right principles of conduct and applying them to the situation at hand. Acquisition of the virtues or their constituents is the aim of character education — i.

Imitation of exemplars is the main way of achieving these aims; 3. We will now evaluate whether and how pointing to the two kinds of exemplars identified so far meets the following four criteria: virtuousness, admirability, imitability, and transparency, i. What we want to highlight, rather, is that the degree of transparency displayed by the exemplar affects the educational stance that the educator can adopt towards the novice.

Yet, other contexts require the educator to select more transparent exemplars in order to make it easier for the novice to grasp their moral excellence and start the admirationimitation process. In conclusion, despite its context-dependency, transparency is an extremely interesting criterion that an exemplar-based account of character education must take into consideration.

In conclusion, we reconsider the soundness of our stance, namely endorsing prima facie a weakly disunitarist view in moral theory to evaluate its consequences at an educational level.